It is necessary to note that Russia has specific levers to hit the target. Moscow thinks she somehow solved the problem by buying up all the Azerbaijani gas and promising Baku a spice-cake in the form of the Karabakh conflict "regulation". Not by chance, indeed, were the Madrid principles, whose essence was long a widely known secret, promulgated especially these days. However, hardly can Azerbaijan seriously believe that the resolution will be quite pleasing for Baku. As a matter of fact, Russia is not the one to make resolutions, no matter how much she seeks it, because she definitely does not match the role of a mediator-peacemaker. The same spice-cake is stored up also for Armenia, but with some reservations and conditions.
However, Moscow forgets one essential matter: the isolation of Iran is not eternal, changes in the region occur very frequently and who can assert that tomorrow Iran will not be allowed to the gas pipe? She will be allowed for one simple reason: the Azerbaijani gas, even if it is completely pumped into Nabucco, is not sufficient anyway. So, the Turkmen or Iranian gas will be necessary. Iran, which holds the second place in the world with its gas deposits, can easily fill up Nabucco. As far as the Turkmen gas is concerned, Teheran can simply buy it up and deliver it to China and the Far East countries, which would be both cheaper and faster.
Actually, everything at present depends on the choice of the gas pipe route. The essential thing to do is to bring the pipeline into Turkey, and there are two ways to do it: either to bring it from Turkmenistan through Azerbaijan and Georgia, or from Iran through Armenia. The first route is political and economic, while the second is purely economic and profitable. To all appearances, the story of the oil pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan repeats itself: it would have been economically more profitable for it to pass through Armenia, but Baku with the support of Turkey and Georgia did everything in her power to obstruct the realization of this project. However, things are much more complicated with Nabucco. First, it is longer and, hence, more expensive. Second, it is essential for Europe, because the latter needs to finally reject the delivery of the Russian gas. Well, for the same purposes Nabucco is also necessary to the region. In any event Russia will not be able to control the gas pipe, irrespective of which country it passes through, because she will have to manage to close the valve in two countries simultaneously, and no one has yet succeeded in doing it. Sure, Moscow will try to impede the construction process and to dictate conditions. Moreover, she will do it by way of Armenia, which in the West is considered to be the chief pro-Russian country in the South Caucasus. And again the Iranian factor comes to the fore. It is possible to come to an agreement with three Caucasian countries (by hook or by crook), but Iran, who claims to the role of the regional power, will definitely carry out her own policy. The USA still says that Nabucco can be filled with the Russian gas, but never with the Iranian. However, it is said only now, but as we have already noted, there is one more possible scenario. After the presidential elections there began cleanings on the very top in Iran, and Leader of the Iranian nuclear program Gholamreza Aghazadeh, who supported main oppositionist of the country Mir-Hossein Mousavi, retired. Moreover, if Europe has to choose between Iran and Russia as gas suppliers, most likely she will give preference to Iran: in spite of the "irreconcilability of ayatollahs" it is always possible reach understanding with Teheran. And though it is also possible to reach an agreement with Moscow, it is too costly. It's no less difficult to negotiate with Iran or Iraq, who are ready to contribute their mite into Nabucco, but there will clearly be no blackmail on their part. Although, who knows? But, in any event, under equal conditions, the East gives preference to expediency and not to instantaneous political or economic gains.
As far as the two supposed branches are concerned, here, unfortunately, almost everything depends on Russia, or, to be more accurate, on her power in resolving her regional problems. Nabucco may become that point of no return, after which Moscow will have great difficulty in controlling not only the conflict situation in the Caucasus, but also the relations with seemingly friendly countries: Iran, Azerbaijan and Armenia. Georgia, naturally, is not counted – relations with it have been damaged for long. In a broader sense, the project is yet beneficial far only for Turkey as the basic transit country. Armenia can earn dividends only if she becomes the second transit county. But truly serious geopolitical changes are necessary for this.
